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ABSTRACT 
 
After the dotcom-breakdown in 2000, German IPOs came to a sudden standstill and recovery took 
several years. Empirical evidence on German IPO activities so far focused mostly on the 
preceding new economy bubble. In contrast, this contribution aims at investigating the post-
dotcom IPO market in Germany, using a sample of 182 IPOs between March 2002 and April 
2011. The influences of private equity investors, underwriters and the market segment on the 
flotation are analyzed. Subsequently, driving factors of underpricing are identified. Our results 
indicate that especially offering characteristics affect underpricing. Furthermore, the company’s 
age and the industry have a significant impact. Private equity investors, major underwriters and 
the market segment lost their empirically observable influence on underpricing. For the post-
dotcom market environment, the results show a shift towards other hot-issue industries, a cooling 
down of investor sentiments and no significant reduction in ex-post uncertainty concerning new 
market segments. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
ince a vital stock market is the main requirement for a successful IPO, the issuing volume relies on the 
economic environment (Jenkinson and Ljungqvist 2001). German IPO activity traditionally is less distinct 
in comparison to the US or the UK, regarding the number of flotations and volume raised (Black and 
Gilson 1998). Between 1984 and 1996 the average number of IPOs had been 19.5 per year (Franzke et al. 2003), a 
remarkably low figure for one of the world’s leading economies. This case changed fundamentally in 1997 with the 
implementation of the Neuer Markt (New Market), a market segment for technology and growth companies. This 
innovation was responsible for a tremendous increase in IPOs in Germany (see Figure 1). For the first time, young 
and innovative German enterprises gained direct access to the stock market and therefore to equity supply. The 
boom, combined with the worldwide information technology hype, led to inappropriate valuations. The burst came 
in 2000, when the dotcom-crisis arose, heading to the final collapse of the Neuer Markt in 2003. Within the next 
years, the Deutsche Börse AG (Frankfurt stock exchange) restructured and renamed all market segments. The IPO 
activity in this time was overshadowed by the aftermath of the dotcom-bubble, resulting in only 12 IPOs from 2002 
to 2004 (see Figure 1). 
 
After four years of recovery, the IPO market returned to former strength. The IPO volume from 2006 to 
2008 even outperformed the activity before the dotcom-hype (pre-1997). By the end of 2007, first indications of a 
new financial crisis came up that reached its peak with the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers. The US housing bubble 
and the subprime crisis were basically responsible for this financial crisis. Within one decade, this was the second 
shock for the German IPO market. In comparison to the dotcom-crisis, where the IPO market totally broke down, 
the IPO activity recovered within two years: in 2010 already 14 companies went public in Germany again. This 
paper aims to focus on the latest, very recent period of the German IPO market: the time after the dotcom-bubble. 
 
In all kind of market conditions IPOs are accompanied by the underpricing phenomenon. It describes the 
substantial price jump after listing compared to the issuing price (Ljungqvist 2007). This price revision during the 
first trading day means a loss of money for the issuer and a gain for investors (Loughran and Ritter 2002). It is a 
S 
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well-documented miracle in the existing literature. Hence, the German market is also affected by underpricing, as 
shown below in Figure 2.  
 
Additionally to its very specific IPO-history, Germany also provides a unique institutional framework for 
an analysis of underpricing. Elston and Yang (2010) describe these features with high insider ownership, a strong 
role of banks and a less developed equity market (see Theissen 2003 for an overview of the German equity market). 
Furthermore, the rearrangement of stock market segments, VCs with a rather short track record and an excessive 
dotcom-bubble make up an exceptional setting to analyze stock flotations. The case of Germany in the period 2002-
2011 (after crisis developments) also perfectly contributes to three shortcomings of the existing research so far: 
 
 Former analyzes on German IPOs investigated nearly exclusively the Neuer Markt. This segment includes 
a wide range of dotcom-IPOs within abnormal market conditions (Günther and Rummer 2006) and does 
not seem to be representative for the German market in general. Studies prior to the bubble years are rare 
and only provide few insights regarding multivariate analysis. After reorganizing the market segments, the 
Neuer Markt does not exist anymore. A detailed view on IPOs in the newly created market segments 
therefore promises new insights regarding flotations in the German institutional setting during non-bubble-
times. 
 The reasons for underpricing vary over time. Loughran and Ritter (2004) find a shift from the winner’s 
curse problem and dynamic information acquisition towards agency problems and market conditions. The 
sample used in this study consists of very recent IPOs from 2002 to 2011, analyzing present developments 
and the impact of experience gained during the dotcom-period in Germany. Hence, this study aims to 
identify the lessons learnt as well as the consequences of the excesses in the bubble-period. 
 Studies so far provided no clear evidence regarding several research questions and leave various puzzles 
concerning private equity (PE) involvement, the role of underwriters (UW), market regulation and the hot-
issue theory. Furthermore, we do not limit our study on the first trading day, but also take post-IPO returns 
into account. 
 
 
Figure 1. Number of IPOs in Germany and Market Segment of Listing 
Source: DAI Factbook (2004) and Deutsche Börse AG. 
 
This contribution hence aims at providing evidence on these shortcomings and testing theories with a focus 
on after crisis developments on the German market. For this purpose, we analyze a unique data sample consisting of 
182 German IPOs in the period from March 2002 to April 2011. At first, we check for differences in means 
regarding PE involvement, major UWs’ presence and the market segments. Then, a regression analysis is performed 
to find possible factors of influence on underpricing as well as short- and medium-term abnormal returns. At that, 
we employ a variety of 22 independent variables to investigate hypotheses based on theoretical foundations. 
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This contribution is organized as follows. The next section outlines the theoretical background of 
underpricing by presenting the relevant models and their underlying theory. Afterwards, an overview of literature 
addressing the German as well as European IPO market is given. The subsequent part formulates hypotheses based 
on the theory presented. The next section introduces the data and variable description as well as the empirical 
approach, followed by the main results and a discussion. The last section concludes and gives an outlook on further 
fields of research. 
 
THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS AND LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
Underpricing is an intensely analyzed phenomenon within the IPO process and financial market research in 
general. Ljungqvist (2007) categorizes the theories regarding reasons for underpricing as follows: asymmetric 
information models, institutional and behavioral models, as well as ownership theories. The asymmetric information 
theory is the most prominent one, grounding on the winner’s curse model (Rock 1986), the ex-ante uncertainty 
model (Beatty and Ritter 1986) and the signaling theory (Allen and Faulhaber 1989; Welch 1989). They all point out 
differences in knowledge between issuer, UW and investors. 
 
Private Equity’s Certification Role 
 
The opinions on the role of PE in the IPO process are contrary. According to the definition of the European 
Private Equity and Venture Capital Association (EVCA), PE includes the following investment stages: venture 
capital (VC), growth capital, replacement capital, rescue/turnaround capital and buyouts (EVCA 2011). Megginson 
and Weiss (1991) highlight the participation of PE in the IPO process as a proof of quality for the issuing firm. From 
this point of view PE fulfills a certification role. On the other hand, following the grandstanding theory, the role of a 
PE investor is said to be critical. PE investors have incentives to push the IPO process, even though the firm is not 
ready. IPOs generate cash for new investments and increase the investor’s reputation, which is an important factor in 
the following fundraising. Since PE holdings are of temporary character - the average life-time of a VC-fund has a 
maximum of 10 years (Gompers and Lerner 2006) - time is of critical relevance. These incentives lead to premature 
IPOs and therefore to higher underpricing (Gompers 1996; Gompers and Lerner 2006). Former research shows 
mixed results and provides evidence for both hypotheses (Megginson and Weiss 1991; Lin and Smith 1998; Francis 
and Hasan 2001; Lee and Wahal 2004).  
 
 
Figure 2: Median Underpricing of German IPOs. 
Source: Höllbacher (2011) till 1996, afterwards own calculations. 
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Underwriters’ Affiliations and Maximization of its Investors’ Shares 
 
The UW is another important institution involved in the IPO process and possibly also influences 
underpricing. The role of an UW is typically taken by an investment bank (IB). The underwriting process contains a 
wide range of steps. During the preparation of the IPO main tasks are the due diligence and prospectus drafting 
followed by the application for listing. The second step is to set up with the market approach including pre-IPO 
research reports and all kinds of marketing activities, which lead to the final book-closing. In the end, the IB and the 
issuer have to set the offering price. This is a crucial point regarding profit maximization for both the issuer as well 
as the investor. In doing so, the IB has to match the interests of both sides (Iannotta 2010). 
 
For Carter and Manaster (1990) the IB’s reputation is the key factor influencing underpricing. Only large 
UWs are able to realize the required analytical activity and network to ensure a successful placement (Hill and 
Wilson 2006). The costs of such research are high, so only “high value” firms are able to afford this service. Due to 
the implied accuracy of the firm’s valuation, underpricing is reduced and investors do not have to fear negative 
underpricing. Moreover, Baron (1982) highlights the better information access of IBs in comparison to issuing firms 
or investors. For IBs, preplanned underpricing is necessary in two ways. First, the underpricing rewards old and 
attracts future investors and, in a second step, it guarantees the placement of all shares. Contrary to previous studies, 
Pollock et al. (2004) ground their theory on the well-developed investor-UW-issuer-relationship. Due to these 
sensitive business relations, the UW cannot take the risk to play an active role in influencing the underpricing 
process. Ljungqvist and Wilhelm (2003) argue that underpricing is reduced, if the IB holds shares in the issuing 
company. Such affiliations improve the alignment of UW and issuer. For his own benefit, the UW sets a higher 
offering price. Especially the German bank-based system could be affected by this theory (Bessler and Kurth 2007). 
In the dotcom-bubble, VCs and UWs acted as repeat players. Hoberg and Seyhun (2006) argue that both collaborate 
and exchange favors. VCs, on the one hand, accept higher levels of underpricing, favoring the UWs. On the other 
hand, UWs provide marketing support and favorable analyst coverage after the IPO. This enables the VCs to sell 
their retained shares at a high price (Loughran and Ritter 2004; Tykvova and Walz 2007). 
 
Underpricing and Market Regulations 
 
Another effect on underpricing is set by financial market regulations. Hunger (2005) shows in a European 
study, that mean underpricing is significantly lower in official markets. Therefore greater corporate transparency 
reduces the cost of information gathering and - considering the asymmetric information model - decreases the level 
of underpricing (Hopp and Dreher 2007). For the German market, basic requirements for the regulated market are 
annual and interim reports in accordance with IFRS, while for the exchange regulated market (open market) an 
annual report in national GAAP is sufficient (Deutsche Börse AG 2011). The regulated market also has admission 
criteria regarding the company’s age, equity amount and free float according to the German Stock Exchange 
Admission Regulation (Börsenzulassungsverordnung BörsZulV). Nevertheless, in comparison to these current non-
regulated market segments, the Neuer Markt offered a wide range of requirements to ensure transparency: reports on 
a quarterly basis according to US-GAAP or IAS had to be published (Vitols and Engelhardt 2005).  
 
Investor Activity in Certain Sectors: The Hot Issue Theory 
 
Some authors argue that focused interest and investors’ activity in certain sectors leads to underpricing. 
During certain times investors develop extraordinary interest for specific industries. Within these “hot issue” periods 
and industries, the number of IPOs increases. The rising IPO activity leads to overvaluation and therefore to 
underpricing (Ritter 1984; Ibbotson and Jaffe 1975). The Neuer Markt is a well-known example for this 
phenomenon, in which investors bought high tech shares without looking at fundamental values. 
 
Recent Developments in the German IPO Market 
 
Though not catching as much attention as Anglo-American capital markets (recent contributions are 
provided by Dolvin and Bradford 2008, Arthurs et al. 2008, Guo et al. 2006; Hill and Wilson 2006), the literature 
provides a variety of studies on the Continental-European IPO market. For example, Kunz and Aggarwal (1994) as 
well as Drobetz et al. (2003) focus on Switzerland, while Aussenegg (2007) analyzes the Austrian market (other 
European studies can be found in Engelen and Essen 2010 and Gregoriou 2006).  
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There are only few contributions dealing with underpricing in the German market prior to 1997 and hence 
the beginning of the dotcom-period. Uhlir (1989a) shows that there had been hot-issue markets even then. Uhlir 
(1989) provides evidence that stocks with high underpricing underperform in the following months. Wasserfallen 
and Wittleder (1994) as well as Ljungqvist (1997) only find coherence between underpricing and market conditions. 
Ljungqvist (1997) also detects a positive relation to share retention and a negative to the proceeds. Other authors, 
such as Schmidt (1988) and Göppl and Sauer (1990) only show descriptive statistics. 
 
The vast majority of following-up studies solely focused on the Neuer Markt. Those contributions were 
provided by Mayer (2001), Schertler (2002), Leuz (2003), Hunger (2003), Rindermann (2004), Löffler et al. (2005) 
and Franzke (2004). Showing a lot of contradictory evidence, the authors mostly agreed on the enhancing impact of 
bear markets and market conditions on underpricing. Some authors found no relation between institutional investors’ 
ownership (such as PE or VC), some detect an underpricing driving effect.  
 
More recent studies are those by Aussenegg et al. (2006), Günther and Rummer (2006), Tykvova and Walz 
(2007), Dorn (2009) and Elston and Yang (2010). Some found a negative effect of VC and positive coherence with 
previous market returns and the company’s market value. Like German studies, international and European 
contributions show quite puzzling results (Sentis 2009; Ferretti and Meles 2011). For a summary of studies on 
Securities Offerings see Eckbo et al. (2007), Cornelli et al. (2006) or Florin and Simsek (2007).  
 
HYPOTHESES 
 
This section develops five hypotheses (H1 to H5) to be tested in the empirical analysis of the following 
section. H1 covers prospects about the influence of PE involvement. As shown before, the role of PE in the IPO 
process is highly controversial. Common hypotheses are set up according to the certification role and the 
grandstanding theory. In our contribution, we focus on the after crisis effects of PE. Following the grandstanding 
theory only young and less experienced PE firms need to use their track record as a marketing instrument and 
therefore have to accelerate the IPO process (Gompers 1996). During the dotcom-bubble many new PE firms were 
established (Tykvova and Walz 2007). The growth rates in this industry were tremendous and not all firms were 
experienced enough to make proper investment decisions (Rindermann 2004). Many PE investments were 
inappropriate and based on mispricing. After the dotcom-bubble, many of these inexperienced firms went out of 
business and a self-purification of the PE market started (Leopold et al. 2003). As a result, the players described in 
the grandstanding-process are no longer active on the market. This indicates that grandstanding is perhaps not an 
issue anymore. Additionally, we assume that during the dotcom-crisis PE firms lost much of their reputation and yet 
were not able to regain their certification role in the after crisis years. Hence, we argue that PE is no proof of 
certification and underpricing of PE backed firms does not differ significantly. 
 
H1.  PE backed IPOs does not affect underpricing. 
 
Loughran and Ritter (2004) argue that – during the internet bubble period – there had been a shift in the 
willingness of firms to employ underwriters with a history of underpricing. In exchange, UWs provide analyst 
coverage and side payments to the CEO. During the dotcom-era the German market featured one of the most severe 
underpricing in the world (Engelen and Essen 2010) leading to high losses of investors when the bubble burst. Thus, 
the certification role of major underwriters (Booth and Smith 1986) and their analysts might have suffered badly. 
This may lead to a situation in which companies no longer accept high amounts of money left on the table, because 
UWs - due to lost reputation - cannot provide as much demand for their stocks as in former times.  
 
In a bank-based system like Germany major UWs are intensely affiliated. The probability that the UW 
holds equity stakes in the issuing company is even higher. This leads to reduced underpricing, if a major underwriter 
is involved. In this contribution, the UW’s market shares are used as a surrogate for its reputation (for a detailed 
explanation see table 2). The post 2002-period became a success story for IBs: never before, they earned such 
enormous amounts of money. These times ended with the financial crisis in 2008 and the bankruptcy of Lehmann 
Brothers. Afterwards, competition became more aggressive and IBs had to fight for market shares. In this 
environment, it was essential to maximize the value of their investors’ shares (Loughran and Ritter 2002; Baron and 
Holmström 1980; Reuter 2006). Due to this competition, each IB tries to serve their investors best, leading to higher 
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underpricing during these times. In this context underpricing serves as a marketing instrument for customers. On the 
other hand, such behavior could have a bad impact on the sensitive relations to the issuer (Dunbar 2000). According 
to the market conditions in Germany, UW affiliations seem to outweigh the function as a marketing instrument 
(Muscarella and Vetsuypens 1989; Ljungqvist and Wilhelm 2003). 
 
H2.  IPOs using major underwriters are less underpriced. 
 
The main German stock exchange in Frankfurt provides several market segments with differing listing 
requirements. Regarding the former Neuer Markt, Hunger (2003) notices that its higher listing requirements did not 
lead to lower underpricing, contradicting the theory of a reduced ex-ante uncertainty. During the dotcom-
breakdown, the Neuer Markt totally lost its reputation. Hence, there was a need for new market segments which 
have been installed after the crisis. It seems interesting whether Hunger’s observation still holds for the new market 
segments that divide into the Regulierter Markt (regulated Market by European law) and the Open Market 
(regulated unofficial market). The experiences during the dotcom-bubble, involving mispricing of start-ups led to 
higher demand for older and more mature firms. These are more likely to be listed in the regulated market. Due to 
higher transparency, such regulations should reduce underpricing. 
 
H3.  After crisis IPOs listed in the Regulated Market are less underpriced. 
 
According to the hot-issue hypothesis there are periods of special demand for certain industry sectors. 
Public interest for the IT sector cooled down due to experiences during the burst of the dotcom-bubble. New hot-
issues could be the biotech or cleantech sectors, because of the growing number of IPOs in these fields of 
technology. The rising demand for those flotations might also lead to a higher underpricing. In our sample, 12 IPOs 
belong to the biotech and 15 to the cleantech industry.  
 
H4.  IT firms are less underpriced. 
 
H5.  Biotech and cleantech IPOs feature more underpricing. 
 
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
 
Our sample consists of 182 IPOs in the period between March 2002 and April 2011, representing all IPOs 
in Germany after the dotcom-bubble burst to present. The data is collected out of the Hoppenstedt Aktienführer
1
 
(2002-2011), BVK
2
 studies (2007) and publications of German stock exchange. Additional information is taken out 
of company reports and IPO prospectuses. Stock quotations are gathered from yahoo-finance. 
 
The variables investigated in the empirical part of the study can be separated into dependent variables, 
company characteristics, IPO-features and market circumstances. The dependent variables are underpricing as well 
as short- and medium-term buy-and-hold abnormal returns (BHAR). Following a wide range of empirical studies, 
we define Underpricing of the i
th
 IPO as the difference between the issuing price (PI) and the first trading day’s 
closing price (PC, see Formula 1). 
 
              
           
    
 (1) 
 
Since UWs are said to influence trading in the first days of quotation to ensure a positive underpricing to 
leave a good taste in the mouth (Ibbotson 1975a; Ellis et al. 2000), a look on the short- and medium term 
development of share prices may show a less distorted picture of the extent of underpricing. Short- and medium-
term abnormal returns are calculated as the stock’s return (  
 ) over n=20 and n=60 trading days, corrected for 
market movements, using the SDAX as benchmark (  
     ).The SDAX consists of 50 German smallcaps. The 
returns include underpricing, assuming that shares are bought at the offering price. Hence, the other dependent 
variables are created, following Formula 2 (Bessler and Kurth 2007). 
 
                                                 
1 Annual containing a variety of information regarding shares listed in Germany. 
2 The BVK is the German Private Equity and Venture Capital Association. 
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    (2) 
 
Table 1: List of Variables 
Variable Description 
Underpricing Simple Underpricing, see formula (1) 
BHAR20 BHAR 20 trading days after  IPO, relative to the SDAX 
BHAR60 BHAR 60 trading days after  IPO, relative to the SDAX 
LN(Age) log of (Age + 1) 
PEInvestor Dummy variable indicating the presence of a private equity investor (=1, 0 otherwise) 
MTB The Market to Book Ratio of the Stock 
CFperEquity The Cash Flow to Equity ratio of the Stock 
IT Industry Dummy taking the value of 1, if the stock is active in the Information Technology industry 
(0 otherwise) 
Biotech Industry Dummy taking the value of 1, if the stock is active in the biotechnology industry (0 
otherwise) 
Cleantech Industry Dummy taking the value of 1, if the stock is active in the cleantech industry (0 otherwise) 
LN(Vol) log of Issuing volume (no. Of shares offered x issuing price) 
UWMShare Market Share of UW (>0,5%), in %, for a more detailed description see Table 2 (0, else) 
Retention Percentage of shares Retained by former owners 
BookB Dummy for the presence of bookbuilding (=1, 0 otherwise) 
WidthBBRange the width of the offering range relative to the midpoint of the offering range 
WidthBBPeriod number of days in which the bookbuilding takes place (0, if another procedure is used) 
AllotmenttoEmission number of days between the allotment and the first trading day 
PriceUpdate The percentage difference between the midpoint of the offering range and the issuing price 
CeilingLow Dummy variable taking the value of 1 if the issuing price is the lower ceiling of the offer range 
CeilingHigh Dummy variable taking the value of 1 if the issuing price is the upper ceiling of the offer range 
RegulatedMarket Dummy taking the value of 1, if the stock is listed in the regulated market (0 otherwise) 
IndexReturn SDAX market return, within the last 20 trading days prior to the IPO 
NoIPOs number of IPOs within the last 30 days prior to issue 
MeanUnderpricing mean underpricing of the IPOs within the last 30 days 
Note: This table shows the description of the variables used in the empirical analysis. 
 
Table 2: Calculation of UW market shares 
Investment Bank Volume Market-Share [%] Sole-lead manager Co-lead manager 
Deutsche Bank 6,657 26.5 7 17 
Morgan Stanley 3,359 13.4 1 10 
Goldman Sachs 2,174 8.6 1 6 
UBS 2,128 8.5 3 8 
J. P. Morgan 1,903 7.6 1 7 
Credit Suisse FB 1,420 5.6 0 6 
Dresdner Bank 1,221 4.9 3 6 
Citigroup 1,099 4.4 1 3 
Sal. Oppenheim 865 3.4 8 4 
Commerzbank 686 2.7 2 5 
HVB / Uni Credit 655 2.6 3 0 
Equinet 276 1.1 9 2 
Cazenove 274 1.1 1 2 
WestLB 217 0.9 6 2 
LBBW 209 0.8 5 0 
Lehman Brothers 187 0.7 0 3 
ABN AMRO 167 0.7 0 1 
M.M.Warburg 159 0.6 3 2 
Macquarie 148 0.6 1 1 
quirin Bank 144 0.6 7 0 
VEM Aktienbank 133 0.5 18 0 
DZ Bank 127 0.5 4 0 
All Others: 28 banks (sum) 950 2.7 59 4 
Note: This table gives an overview on all UWs with market shares above 0,5%. Market shares are calculated as the sum of the IPO-
volume the bank had been lead manager (see Aussenegg et al. 2006). In case of various co-lead managers, the sum is distributed 
equally on all lead-managers. Those with a market share above 1% are treated as major IBs.  
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Table 3: Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Arithmetic Mean Median Minimum Maximum 
Standard 
Deviation 
Underpricing 0.054 0.015 -0.233 1.000 0.143 
BHAR20 0.027 -0.018 -0.453 1.459 0.232 
BHAR60 0.005 -0.042 -0.579 1.349 0.254 
Ln(Age) 1.849 1.946 0.000 5.318 1.133 
PEInvestor 0.451 
   
0.499 
MTB 3.574 3.042 -1.193 54.000 4.180 
CFperEquity 2.416 0.210 -15.594 241.538 19.763 
IT 0.137 
   
0.345 
Biotech 0.066 
   
0.249 
Cleantech 0.082 
   
0.276 
Ln(Vol) 3.381 3.135 0.000 7.607 1.834 
UWMShare 3.902 0.632 0.000 26.48 6.465 
Retention 0.647 0.672 0.003 0.984 0.179 
BookB 0.753 
   
0.433 
WidthBBRange 0.139 0.154 0.000 0.545 0.103 
WidthBBPeriod 7.456 7.000 0.000 95.000 7.836 
AllotmenttoEmission 6.681 3.000 0.000 197.000 20.874 
PriceUpdate -0.020 0.000 -0.273 0.135 0.070 
CeilingLow 0.236 
   
0.426 
CeilingHigh 0.192 
   
0.395 
RegulatedMarket 0.538 
   
0.500 
IndexReturn 0.011 0.021 -0.160 0.113 0.047 
NoIPOs 4.841 4.000 0.000 15.000 3.883 
MeanUnderpricing 0.057 0.032 -0.072 0.347 0.083 
Note: This table shows the arithmetic mean, median, minimum, maximum as well as the standard deviation of the sample. 
 
This approach – with a much shorter time horizon than Dorn (2009) or Rindermann (2004) – bears two 
advantages: first, within only short periods the bias of the chosen benchmark is not material (Sapusek 2000). 
Second, this contribution focuses on the reasons of underpricing as the difference between issuing price and the 
company’s market value. We think that within at least three months the market will lead to an adequate pricing. It is 
hard to believe that offering characteristics will drive stock performance in the following years. Our approach 
primarily aims at correcting for UW stabilization activities (Aggarwal 2000). Additionally, we can check for 
rebounds caused by investors that only participate in the bookbuilding process to take advantage of the underpricing 
and sell shortly after the IPO. 
 
To capture company characteristics through fundamental valuations this study involves the market to book 
ratio (MTB). The MTB is defined as the ratio of the equity’s book value and the market capitalization, employing 
Formula 3.  
 
     
                       
                               
 (3) 
 
As a second fundamental accounting measure, the cash flow is taken into account. One aim is to correct for 
earnings management (Teoh et al. 1998, Tykvova 2006). This figure is taken as a proportion in relation to the 
company’s equity for comparability reasons. An overview of all variables used is stated in table 1. For differences in 
the bookbuilding procedure between Germany and the US, see Aussenegg et al. (2006). To correct for size-effects, 
some exogenous variables are taken as logarithmic values. Descriptive statistics are shown in table 3. To identify 
differences in subsamples, we use the Wilcoxon rank sum  test (Bauer 1972). Inference of the regression analysis is 
tested through heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors proposed by White (1980). Our regression model is 
structured as followed: 
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       (4) 
 
To check for multi-collinearity, we calculate variance inflation factors for all independent variables in each 
regression model. None of these were upon the critical value of 10, indicating that our results bring out valid 
individual predictors (Kennedy 2003). 
 
RESULTS 
 
The descriptive statistics including the arithmetic mean, the median, min and max as well as the standard 
deviation of the 182 observations are stated in table 3. The table shows high standard deviations with the offering 
volume, indicating a wide range of offering features. Accounting fundamentals also indicate great differences. The 
mean underpricing of the sample is 5.4%. After some trading months, mean underpricing gets smaller the longer the 
period gets, but on the other hand the standard deviation rises. This observation gives support to a development that 
may lead to the documented long-run underperformance of IPOs (Loughran and Ritter 1995). 
 
The results regarding differences in means are presented in table 4. They indicate significant differences 
regarding sub-samples segmented by the presence of a PE investor or a major IB as UW and the market segment, in 
which the shares are listed. 
 
Private Equity 
 
Companies with PE investors use prestigious UWs far more often than those without. These investors focus 
especially on the IT and biotech industry. For the issuing procedure, their investment companies tend to have a 
shorter period between allotment and first trading day. PE investors also seem to choose the IPO day more selective: 
their investment companies go public within more positive market circumstances and in periods, where IPOs happen 
more frequently. 
 
Summarizing, there is no clear evidence that PE backed companies differ significantly regarding 
fundamental figures, such as age, offering volume, cash flow generated or the MTB-ratio. Main differences are the 
industry focus as well as a more professional IPO procedure. Especially the timing of the market entry is well 
prepared. There is also no significant evidence to support H1 since PE investors do not seem to have any impact on 
underpricing. 
 
The UW Reputation: Major IB’s Influence on the IPO 
 
Regarding the differences between companies employing a major IB and those that do not, there are more 
significant observations. Companies with a mean UWMShare above 1% are backed by PE investors more often (as 
seen above). These companies tend to have larger emissions and are mainly listed in the regulated market after using 
a bookbuilding procedure. The fact that the retention rate is smaller cannot be explained by the huge stake of PE 
backed IPOs in this group, because there seems to be no significant relation between PE investors and retention (see 
comparison above). Especially in the cleantech-industry, more prestigious UWs are used more often.  
 
The bookbuilding range is bigger, but the time between allotment and first trading day is shorter. These 
companies generate much more cash flow than the rest of the sample. Though there is no difference in simple 
underpricing, the short- and medium-term abnormal return differs significantly between both groups. Especially 
within the first 20 trading days, those companies with major IBs outperform the others and even after 60 trading 
days this effect still holds. This observation may provide evidence for the assumption that IBs provide stabilization 
activities for the recently issued company. 
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Therefore H2 cannot be supported. Obviously, the major UWs’ affiliations do not have a reducing impact 
on underpricing. However, the short-/medium-term effects induce the opposite: underpricing may be used as a 
marketing instrument for investors.  
 
Market Segment 
 
Due to the fact that the regulated market is a new segment for IPOs, it is of special interest to identify what 
kinds of companies are listed in this market. As seen in the other two comparisons, companies listed in the regulated 
market are accompanied by more prestigious UWs, also implying that their retention rate is smaller and a 
bookbuilding procedure is employed more frequently. As a market segment for more mature companies it is no 
surprise that these companies are larger. Nevertheless, companies going public in the regulated market are not 
significantly older than the others. The width of the bookbuilding range is larger. An explanation for this might be a 
more frequent usage of bookbuilding, since the bookbuilding range of a fixed-price offer is defined as 0 in this 
sample (see table 1). The time between allotment and emission is significantly smaller. 
 
Taking these facts together, IPOs at the regulated market seem to be managed more professionally, by 
major IBs, using a bookbuilding procedure. Placement is executed in a quicker time span between allotment and 
emission. These conditions and special rules of the regulated market surprisingly do not have any effects on 
underpricing, hence providing no evidence for H3. 
 
Table 4: Differences in Means 
Variable 
With 
PEInvestor 
Without 
PEInvestor 
p-value 
 
With 
major 
IB 
Without 
major 
IB 
p-value 
 
IPOs 
Regulated 
Market 
IPOs 
non-
Regulated 
Market 
p-value 
Underpricing 0.053 0.054 0.543 
 
0.070 0.042 0.231 
 
0.041 0.069 0.469 
BHAR20 0.030 0.025 0.339 
 
0.065 0.000 0.010 
 
0.023 0.033 0.455 
BHAR60 -0.006 0.014 0.638 
 
0.050 -0.027 0.015 
 
0.010 -0.001 0.199 
Ln(Age) 1.779 1.907 0.313 
 
1.844 1.853 0.665 
 
1.890 1.802 0.740 
PEInvestor 
    
0.566 0.368 0.008 
 
0.500 0.393 0.149 
MTB 3.906 3.302 0.855 
 
3.257 3.801 0.985 
 
3.157 4.061 0.341 
CFperEquity 4.234 0.925 0.886 
 
2.319 2.485 0.110 
 
4.224 0.306 0.095 
IT 0.207 0.080 0.013 
 
0.118 0.151 0.532 
 
0.122 0.155 0.531 
Biotech 0.110 0.030 0.032 
 
0.066 0.066 0.997 
 
0.082 0.048 0.360 
Cleantech 0.085 0.080 0.898 
 
0.145 0.038 0.010 
 
0.102 0.060 0.301 
Ln(Vol) 3.614 3.191 0.114 
 
4.896 2.295 0.000 
 
4.531 2.041 0.000 
UWMShare 5.557 2.545 0.025 
 
   
 
6.749 0.582 0.000 
Retention 0.629 0.662 0.113 
 
0.577 0.697 0.000 
 
0.596 0.706 0.000 
BookB 0.780 0.730 0.435 
 
0.895 0.651 0.000 
 
0.857 0.631 0.000 
WidthBBRange 0.148 0.130 0.366 
 
0.160 0.123 0.024 
 
0.162 0.111 0.000 
WidthBBPeriod 6.524 8.220 0.265 
 
7.105 7.708 0.802 
 
7.020 7.964 0.849 
AllotmenttoEmission 6.012 7.230 0.055 
 
4.355 8.349 0.000 
 
3.449 10.452 0.000 
PriceUpdate -0.023 -0.018 0.448 
 
-0.010 -0.028 0.096 
 
-0.020 -0.020 0.709 
CeilingLow 0.220 0.250 0.632 
 
0.211 0.255 0.491 
 
0.265 0.202 0.321 
CeilingHigh 0.159 0.220 0.298 
 
0.276 0.132 0.015 
 
0.214 0.167 0.419 
RegulatedMarket 0.598 0.490 0.149 
 
0.842 0.321 0.000 
    IndexReturn 0.019 0.004 0.025 
 
0.012 0.010 0.585 
 
0.013 0.009 0.673 
NoIPOs 5.500 4.300 0.062 
 
4.974 4.745 0.528 
 
4.551 5.179 0.216 
MeanUnderpricing 0.057 0.057 0.871 
 
0.064 0.052 0.509 
 
0.063 0.050 0.644 
n 82 100 
  
76 106 
  
98 84 
 Note: This table shows the differences of the arithmetic means of the variables employed and the p-value indicated by the Wilcoxon rank 
sum test with continuity correction. Bold figures represent significance levels below 10%. 
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Table 5: Regression Results 
Variable St. Beta t-value 
 
St. Beta t-value 
  
St. Beta t-value 
 
St. Beta t-value 
  
St. Beta t-value 
 
St. Beta t-value 
 
Dep Underpricing 
 
Underpricing 
  
BHAR20 
 
BHAR20 
  
BHAR 60 
 
BHAR60 
 (Intercept) -0.023 -0.534 
 
-0.006 -0.154 
  
-0.155 -1.822 . -0.146 -1.645 
  
-0.199 -2.130 * -0.060 -1.185 * 
LN(Age) 0.113 1.699 . 0.110 1.884 . 
 
0.129 1.836 . 0.114 1.841 . 
 
0.124 1.797 . 0.156 2.353 . 
PEInvestor 0.030 0.393 
     
0.040 0.566 
     
0.037 0.524 
    MTB -0.082 -1.492 
     
-0.071 -1.566 
 
    
-0.051 -1.208 
    CFperEquity 0.045 1.430 
     
0.016 0.516 
     
-0.003 -0.084 
    IT -0.125 -2.052 * -0.121 -2.178 * 
 
-0.065 -1.039 
     
-0.081 -1.294 
    Biotech -0.060 -0.948 
     
-0.122 -1.829 . -0.101 -1.912 . 
 
-0.115 -1.653 
    Cleantech 0.124 2.259 * 0.133 2.596 * 
 
0.070 0.964 
     
0.054 0.765 
    
LN(Vol) 0.070 0.628 
     
0.353 2.652 ** 0.378 4.214 ** 
 
0.369 2.860 ** 0.179 2.932 ** 
UWMShare 0,104 1,328 0.093 2.016 * -0.014 -0.191     -0.068 -0.951     
Retention 0.222 3.209 ** 0.173 2.414 * 
 
0.178 2.142 * 0.167 1.951 . 
 
0.184 2.159 * 
   
BookB -0.272 -2.336 * -0.330 -3.883 *** 
 
-0.301 -1.971 . -0.300 -3.274 ** 
 
-0.304 -1.982 * -0.255 -2.888 ** 
WidthBBRange -0.042 -0.411 
     
0.018 0.130 
     
0.095 0.677 
    WidthBBPeriod -0.096 -2.084 * -0.080 -2.254 * 
 
-0.107 -2.245 * -0.088 -2.310 * 
 
-0.086 -1.736 . 
   AllotmenttoEmission 0.033 0.322 
     
0.069 0.631 
     
0.058 0.499 
    PriceUpdate 0.068 0.543 
     
0.062 0.408 
     
0.134 0.869 
    CeilingLow 0.031 0.466 
     
0.039 0.454 
     
0.099 1.140 
    CeilingHigh 0.269 2.560 * 0.321 4.493 *** 
 
0.126 1.485 
 
0.134 2.112 * 
 
0.158 1.770 . 0.237 3.705 ** 
RegulatedMarket -0.103 -1.282 
     
-0.147 -1.620 
 
-0.59 -1.723 . 
 
-0.115 -1.276 
    IndexReturn 0.251 3.211 ** 0.246 3.746 *** 
 
0.130 1.282 
     
0.042 0.441 
    NoIPOs -0.019 -0.280 
     
0.030 0.424 
     
-0.095 -1.337 
 
   
MeanUnderpricing -0.029 -0.527 
     
-0.067 -1.020 
     
-0.061 -0.974 
    
Adj. R-squared / (n): 0.22 (182) 
 
0.25 (182) 
  
0.08 (182) 
 
0.12 (182) 
  
0.09 (182) 
 
0.12 (182) 
 Note: This table shows the empirical results out of the regression analysis on model. “.”, “*”, “**”, “***” represent 10%, 5%, 1% and 0,1% significance levels respectively (bold figures). 
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Regression Results: Drivers of Underpricing 
 
The results of the regression analysis for the three dependent variables - underpricing and short-/medium-
term abnormal returns after 20 resp. 60 trading days - are stated in table 5. Beside the coefficients and t-values for 
the whole range of variables, we employed a stepwise exclusion of variables (those with the smallest coherence) to 
test for the robustness of coherences. 
 
The figures stated in table 4 imply that IPOs with PE involvement always employ prestigious UWs. This 
feature of the German market may raise doubts about the independence of both variables. For our regression 
analysis, we address this threat on the one hand with the stepwise exclusion of variables; on the other hand, we run 
our regressions excluding PE resp. IBbig. The latter results (not stated) do not show any difference regarding the 
insignificance of both variables. 
 
Variables influencing simple underpricing are especially industry and transaction characteristics. The 
company’s age is positively related to underpricing. The IT sector reduces, while the cleantech industry drives 
underpricing, providing evidence for H4 and H5 (hot-issues/cold-issues). However, H5 seems not to hold in case of 
the biotech industry. Regarding the offering characteristics, retention enlarges and bookbuilding reduces 
underpricing significantly. An enlarging width of the bookbuilding period brings out smaller underpricing, while the 
variable CeilingHigh leads to higher underpricing. The index return prior to the IPO has a positive effect on 
underpricing. After stepwise exclusion, the UWMShare also shows positive linkage to underpricing. For all other 
variables, results regarding the significance are robust. 
 
Looking at the short-term performance after 20 trading days, the companies’ age drives stock performance. 
The intercept also shows a significant negative estimate. A larger issuing volume goes in line with superior 
performance. Like the previous regressions, retention, bookbuilding and the width of the bookbuilding period 
influence underpricing in the same directions. While IT and cleantech are not significant, biotech has a negative 
influence on underpricing. Stepwise exclusion leads to varying results indicating that the relations shown are not as 
robust as with the simple underpricing: the intercept loses significance, while CeilingHigh and the market segment 
become significant. 
 
Within 60 trading days after going-public the company’s age, the issuing volume, bookbuilding and 
CeilingHigh have significant influence on out- and underperformance. The intercept indicates that IPOs in general 
underperform significantly. Less robust are those relations between BHAR and retention. 
 
DISCUSSION 
 
This study aims not only to identify reasons for underpricing but also to discuss changes in regard to those 
findings for the bubble period. To make these changes more clearly, table 6 provides an overview on the main 
results of former studies dealing with the dotcom-bubble and those of our study. The most striking change regarding 
reasons for underpricing in the Neuer Markt and the after crisis environment is that market sentiments lost most of 
their influence on valuation. In fact, underpricing is still positively related to the index return prior to the IPO, but 
neither the number of IPOs nor recent mean underpricing have explanatory power in our sample. This underlines the 
observation that investor sentiments cooled down considerably. The return of the benchmark index only influences 
the initial return and not short- and medium-term abnormal returns. Hence, market returns of the time between 
bookbuilding and first trading day seem to be priced into the first quotations but do not matter for later trading 
anymore. 
 
However, when regarding investors’ interest for certain industries, our results validate the hot-issue 
hypothesis even in the post-bubble environment. Within our sample, we identified two potential hot-issue industries: 
the cleantech and biotech sector. The results can only confirm an outstanding demand for the cleantech industry, 
whereas the biotech sector does not seem to gain special interest in Germany. Biotech only shows a negative 
coherence once after 20 trading days of listing, therefore findings are only little reliable. As a former bubble-
industry the IT-sector has now become more realistic in market expectations. Due to lessons learned in the 
NeuerMarkt the valuations came down and today, there is rather an “overpricing” in the IT sector. These results 
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considering IT and cleantech are only significant for initial returns. Former research – except Mayer (2001) and 
Ljungqvist and Wilhelm (2002) – also showed that it is hard to detect robust linkages. In contrary, most European 
studies found clear evidence for a relation between the IT sector and underpricing in the dotcom-period. 
Nevertheless, our short-term results are consistent with a strong demand for the cleantech industry and lower-than-
average demand for IT shares. In the post-dotcom period, investor activities focus on other industries due to changes 
in the market environment.  
 
The new segments in the German stock market do not influence underpricing, indicating that the 
regulations are not differing regarding the reduction of information asymmetry. This may imply that the differences 
in listing requirements are not considerable. This evidence is contrary to Franzke (2004), Günther and Rummer 
(2006) for the Neuer Markt and contrary to H3. Since the Neuer Markt – despite having the most comprehensive 
listing requirements - was denoted by the highest underpricing, market segments also may lead to higher demand 
due to a very positive reputation. As the participants do not seem to honor any of the market segments, this 
argument also does not seem to hold. 
 
Looking at the firm’s age, the positive coherence is remarkable, because an older company is said to bear 
less risk and hence a lower ex-ante uncertainty. Besides some authors that do not find significant relations, Günther 
and Rummer (2006) document this expected negative correlation. Only Tykvova and Walz (2007) also show that 
older firms are more underpriced. Reasons might be found in a higher demand for more mature IPOs that leads to 
rising valuations. The superior medium-term performance of older companies (as well as larger ones) might provide 
evidence for this assumption. Our findings regarding the retention rate are also difficult to interpret. The intuition 
leads to the suggestion that a higher retention rate signals the quality of the IPO and hence reduces ex-ante 
uncertainty. Nevertheless, we find that underpricing correlates positively with the fraction of shares unsold. This 
confirms the results of Leuz (2003) and Aussenegg et al. (2006) but is contrarian to those of Günther and Rummer 
(2006) or Elston and Yang (2010). Bradley and Jordan (2002) argue that the cost per share caused by underpricing 
drops if a higher fraction of shares is retained by the issuers. Thus, underpricing is not that harmful for former 
owners. Further, a rising retention rate reduces the number of shares offered and higher underpricing might be 
caused by a smaller supply meeting a given level of demand (Ritter 2003). Our observation that the coherence still 
holds after some weeks supports this argumentation. 
 
The market to book ratio (MTB), as an accounting measure, does not explain underpricing in our models 
(except in one regression). This evidence goes in line with the results of Elston and Yang (2010), while Dorn (2009) 
Tykvova and Walz (2007) find positive relations. This implies that differences between book and market values are 
not helpful to capture ex-ante uncertainty. Even the cash flow per equity has no observable impact on underpricing, 
involving that both fundamentals do not seem to influence neither underpricing nor performance. 
 
Referring to offering characteristics, our study provides various insights. While past publications, such as 
Löffler et al. (2005), Leuz (2003) or Tykvova and Walz (2007) show a reducing effect of the offering volume on 
underpricing, those of Dorn (2009), Günther and Rummer (2006), Tykvova and Walz (2007) as well as Elston and 
Yang (2010) provide evidence that underpricing rises with higher total company’s value (Mayer 2001, Schertler 
2002, Ljungqvist and Wilhelm 2002 and Aussenegg et al. 2006 find no significant relation). The results at hand 
indicate positive coherence between the volume issued and abnormal performance after some trading days, 
indicating that the volume sold does not affect underpricing but begins to matter after trading started. This may be 
caused by a higher public interest in bigger IPOs. Bookbuilding, CeilingHigh and the bookbuilding period show a 
strong coherence with underpricing. This evidence shows that the bookbuilding procedure is able to reduce 
underpricing and that issuing prices set at the upper limit of the offering range lead to positive initial returns (these 
results go in line with those of Elston and Yang 2010 and Aussenegg et al. 2006). Longer bookbuilding periods 
seem to lead to a more accurate pricing, since this variable is negatively related to underpricing. 
 
Our analysis finds no evidence to confirm either the certification role or the grandstanding hypothesis for 
PE investors. Though PE significantly focuses on growth industries and is able to manage an IPO more 
professionally, their presence does not affect underpricing at all. This evidence goes in line with findings of Mayer 
(2001), Hack and Lehmann (2006) and Elston and Yang (2010). Beside Schertler (2002), who finds slight evidence 
that PE involvement leads to higher underpricing, Franzke et al. (2003) and Tykvova and Walz (2007) document 
International Business & Economics Research Journal – January 2013 Volume 12, Number 1 
58 http://www.cluteinstitute.com/  © 2013 The Clute Institute 
that underpricing is in positive relation to the rank of the VC. These observations may not be explained by 
grandstanding but rather a higher affiliation of VCs and UWs (Loughran and Ritter 2004, Hoberg and Seyhun 2006). 
In case those rather prestigious and experienced PE investors are more likely to have survived the crisis, one could 
expect the underpricing to rise, if the old coherence still holds. Since our sample does not show this result, these 
agency conflicts do not seem to matter anymore. Due to bad sentiments during the dotcom-bubble, after-crisis-
investors do not seem to trust the certification role of PE investors. On the other hand, there is no evidence, that PE 
investors foster the IPO process for their own benefit. The affiliation theory of PE and UWs in the German bank-
based market cannot be confirmed. Hence, we do not observe the certification role of PE in the post-dotcom period, 
supporting H1. This expands former results that were solely focused on the Neuer Markt-period. 
 
Table 6: Evidence on Underpricing for the Neuer Markt (New Market) and the Post-Dotcom Period 
Variable Neuer Markt Post-Dotcom period 
Age -/o/+ o/+ 
PE involved o/+ o 
Market to book ratio o/+ o 
Cashflow per Equity o o 
IT o/+ - 
Biotech 
 
o 
Cleantech  
 
+ 
Volume o/- o 
UWMShare -/o/+ o/+ 
Retention -/o/+ + 
Bookbuilding used 
 
- 
Width bookbuilding range - o 
Width bookbuilding period 
 
- 
Allotment to emission 
 
o 
PriceUpdate -/+ o 
CeilingLow 
 
o 
CeilingHigh + + 
RegulatedMarket + (Neuer Markt) o 
IndexReturn o/+ + 
NoIPOs o/+ o 
MeanUnderpricing o/+ o 
Note: This table shows the empirical results of this study (right column) and the different evidence for underpricing in Germany out of 
the studies presented in the literature review. Negative significant results are denoted as “-“, positive as “+”, if significant results 
are lacking the symbol “o” is used. Empty spots have not been analyzed in the Neuer Markt. 
 
Empirical studies regarding the dotcom bubble showed slight evidence that the more prestigious the IB 
acting as UW, the lower the underpricing. Through this study, we cannot find such results. Our findings induce little 
evidence for the opposite. Like other studies – e.g. Schertler (2002), Aussenegg et al. (2006), Leuz (2003) or 
Franzke (2004) -, we do not find a robust influence of the presence of a major UW on underpricing (Günther and 
Rummer 2006 find a negative one). Nevertheless, it seems that IPOs managed by major UWs differ significantly in 
the going-public procedure. This observation can be caused by a loss of certification role of major UWs. Investors, 
who lost enormous sums of money in the Neuer Markt, might not be willing to trust in particular those IBs that 
accompanied IPOs during the bubble. Even the higher affiliation of UWs in the German bank-based systems does 
not seem to lead to a reduced information asymmetry and hence to lower underpricing.  
 
Regarding the institutional framework in Germany, our results go in line with these of Elston and Yang 
(2010) who find no influence of PE or major IBs’ involvement on underpricing. The authors argue that German VCs 
are too young and relatively weak to lower information asymmetry. Though PE became more mature in Germany, 
we still do not find significant influences. The lack of significance indicates on the one hand, that agency conflicts 
are not that heavy to lead to a higher underpricing but, on the other hand, the institutions involved are not able to 
reduce money left on the table. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
This contribution investigates the underpricing phenomenon in a post-crisis environment with special 
emphasis on the role of PE investors, UWs and market segments. Furthermore a large scale of underpricing driving 
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factors is analyzed. The data set grounds on 182 IPOs that took place in the German market between March 2002 
and April 2011, representing all IPOs of the post-crisis period in Germany. 
 
Within the most recent period, underpricing reduced to a level comparable to that before the dotcom-bubble 
(see Figure 2). Our sample provides evidence that especially company characteristics, like age and industry, offering 
characteristics, such as retention rate or the employment of bookbuilding as well as the market environment 
influence underpricing. There is only slight evidence for an influence of major UWs in the German bank-based 
market. The most striking change in regard to the bubble-period is the reduction in investor sentiments. The market 
environment does no longer drive underpricing significantly. Nevertheless the industry-focus of investors seems to 
have shifted from IT towards cleantech.  
 
This study is limited by its focus on the German market. To shed further light on this issue, the perspective 
should be broadened with additional countries to get deeper insights in this field of research.   
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